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This article analyzes the possibility and consequences of central 
bank insolvency. Sovereign insolvency may indirectly cause or 
aggravate problems leading to central bank insolvency. Sovereigns 
have a bailout guarantee, either implicitly via loans from major 
central banks or the IMF, or explicitly, as is the case in the 
Eurozone via the European Stability Mechanism. Exchange rate 
stability through these bail-out guarantees allows for a greater 
amount of foreign-denominated debt accumulation than otherwise 
would prove prudent, or profitable. In the event of a crisis, the 
currency mismatch may be problematic for a central bank trying to 
support its banking system. Lacking the ability to supply foreign 
currency in the absence of an international bailout, central banks 
may face insolvency as they try to support an economy indebted in 
foreign currency. 
Keywords: Central bank insolvency; Bailout; monetary policy; IMF; 
sovereign state insolvency; National central banks; Recapitalization of 
central banks. 
Introduction 
Investors typically view central banks as essential institutions for 
the stable functioning of financial markets. Governments entrust 
them with the role of monetary policy and allow them discretion to 
fine-tune the economy to provide either price or economic stability. 
They traditionally use two tools to achieve these goals. The first 
are monetary policy tools at the central bank’s disposal through its 
function as the primary supplier of money in an economy. In this 
regard, there are three operations that allow the central bank to enact 
monetary policy: 1) banking system reserve requirements, 2) direct 
lending through the discount window, and 3) asset purchases or sales 
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that alter the money supply. 
The second area of policy tools involves measures the central 
bank can use to serve in its function as a lender of last resort. 
Institutions that are dangerously nearing insolvency and may cause 
contagion throughout the economy may be assisted directly by central 
bank funding. In this way, an institution’s liabilities may be retired 
and a return to sustainability achieved.  
Limitations on a central bank’s ability to implement these 
functions are determined by the economy’s financial structure. On the 
one hand, the degree to which private liabilities such as bonds have 
been denominated in foreign currencies will dictate how much 
funding the central bank can supply from its asset base, which 
includes both domestic (e.g., government bonds) and foreign-
denominated assets (e.g., foreign-exchange reserves). On the other 
hand, in a fixed exchange-rate regime the degree to which an 
economy runs a positive trade balance or attracts foreign investment 
in turbulent times will determine the amount of foreign exchange 
reserves a central bank may obtain to fund the foreign liabilities of 
insolvent companies.1 Indeed, due to lags in price level adjustments, 
flexible exchange rate regimes also allow prolonged external balances 
to develop into either trade surpluses or deficits.  
The insolvency of a central bank is highly improbable because a 
large part of the central bank´s liabilities (i.e., the monetary base), 
are not liabilities in the usual sense; they do not imply redemption in 
assets other than those it can produce itself. From an accounting 
point of view the monetary base can be written down on the liability 
side, thus increasing the capital position. Losses on the asset side of a 
central bank also affect its capital position. However, the fact remains 
that a central bank may operate with a negative accounting capital 
                                 
1 Aizenman and Sun (2009) have analyzed the use of reserves during the 
recent financial crisis. They find that countries with access to large foreign 
currency reserves were able to use these reserves as a buffer, thus foregoing the 
normal outcome of abandoning a currency peg. In contrast, countries with no 
access to foreign reserves ran the risk of floating their currencies in response to 
the crisis. 
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position because the majority of its liabilities are not liabilities in the 
sense we normally attach to the word.2 
The situation is different when there are foreign-denominated 
liabilities on its balance sheet (for example, IMF loans, swap lines or 
lines of credit from foreign central banks, or loans from foreign 
governments). In these cases, the insolvency of a central bank is 
possible. Alternatively, in light of the functions that the central bank 
exists to serve with regards to the private sector, a pseudo-insolvency 
may obtain if a lack of foreign-denominated assets exist to cover the 
private banking sector’s foreign-denominated liabilities. Having only 
the ability to increase assets in the domestic currency, central banks 
may find themselves impotent if presented with banking sectors 
largely indebted in foreign currencies.  
This paper will outline the conditions that endanger central bank 
solvency. We will see that sovereign insolvency and its current 
solution – namely help by international consortiums of central banks 
led by the IMF – have created a situation that promotes central bank 
insolvency. The implicit bailout guarantees generate the illusion that 
exchange rates may be artificially maintained which, in turn, 
encourages currency mismatching. The currency mismatching may 
then trigger an inability to sustain its banking system and lead to the 
eventual insolvency of a central bank if it secures foreign loans that 
are ultimately unable to be repaid. Repercussions of this eventuality 
are outlined, with the detrimental effects being broad, reaching into 
both the domestic as well as foreign markets. Lastly, we will look at 
some schemes for insuring against such an occurrence. To the degree 
that a central bank is viewed as being a lender of last resort, plans 
must consider the contingency that insolvency may render the bank 
ineffective at providing this function, with alternatives identified. 
                                 
2 Perhaps now more than ever. On January 6, 2011, the Federal Reserve 
changed its accounting procedures to eliminate the possibility of balance sheet 
insolvency by balancing losses on assets against a negative remittance to the 
Treasury. While this accounting rule change removes the appearance of insolvency 
for the Fed, it only delays it as long as the Treasury is willing to continue foregoing 
its profit remittance.  
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Sovereign States and Insolvency 
While the goal of organized insolvency procedures for sovereign 
states, as is the case with defaults on government bonds, has long 
been a desire of economists, politicians and investors, the reality is far 
from settling on a standard. Legal jurisdictions remain mired in 
“unusually intense” competition concerning the proper treatment of 
bankruptcy laws (Fletcher 1999: 10). There is considerably less 
consensus on international insolvency laws than there is in other areas 
of law (Omar 2002; Khachaturian 2007). 
Some have suggested that an international institution such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) should function as an 
international lender of last resort (Fischer 1999; Roubini and Setser 
2004; Obstfeld 2009). In the Eurosystem, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) has been installed to bail out illiquid or potentially 
insolvent governments. When rapid and substantial support is given to 
countries at risk of liquidity or solvency problems, investor confidence 
remains elevated and removes the fear of default on existing debt. 
The circularity of such reasoning is, unfortunately, that such a 
guarantee will entice investors to take on higher degrees of foreign 
debt ex ante with little risk of suffering loses ex post. The elevated level 
of investment in countries guaranteed by a lender of last resort results 
in an increased level of economic activity and stability, because the 
investor base is enlarged relative to the level it would be in the 
absence of this guarantee. 
A secondary issue arises from the enhanced stability of a 
country’s finances. When international investment and confidence in 
a country’s long-term fiscal perspective are increased, foreign 
exchange rate volatility is commensurately reduced. Domestic 
investors are given the subsequent advantage of denominating debts 
in foreign currencies that often offer lower interest rates, and hence, 
secure substantial savings as compared to comparable financing 
denominated in the domestic currency. This shift from domestic to 
foreign funding sources entails a cost that may or may not be 
embedded in the cost of borrowing – namely, , the currency exchange 
risk inherent in any debt undertaking where the currency of the 
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income source or asset is different than that of the liability. Investors 
are tempted to shift the denomination of currency away from the 
domestic money and into relatively cheaper foreign types. Indeed, the 
recent Icelandic boom saw a large influx of foreign-denominated 
funding to take advantage of lower foreign interest rates coupled with 
a stable (indeed, appreciating) Icelandic króna (Bagus and Howden 
2011; Howden 2013a, b). 
Hirsch (1977: 251-252) delineates the two methods that a lender 
of last resort can curb this moral hazard problem. The first is through 
the “English” route of informal controls and the inculcation of a club 
spirit among the guaranteed members to play the game according to 
the established conventions. In return for this responsible and 
“voluntary” behavior, insurance coverage will be comprehensive and 
assured. The second method is for the lender of last resort to exert a 
counterforce on morally hazardous behavior by making no direct 
demands on the banking sector but rather allowing it to face the 
possibility of failure. Depending on the looming threat of a contagion 
resulting from insolvency, the peril of moral hazard cannot be 
completely removed. When there is a case by case decision to pursue 
a bail-out or not, the moral hazard problem remains, especially for 
banks that are so interconnected and large that they regard 
themselves as “too big to fail”. This case by case approach has 
historically been the “German”, and to a lesser extent, the 
“American” approach to reducing moral hazard, though is unable to 
remove it completely.3 
Which approach to prevent or minimize moral hazard best suits 
an economy is a contentious topic. With so much disagreement as to 
whether the powers of lender of last resort should be endowed in a 
central bank or a government’s Treasury, there is a growing 
movement towards allowing bankruptcy proceedings to assume this 
function. However, the reality of conflicting international insolvency 
                                 
3 Regardless of the implementation scheme, moral hazard cannot be 
effectively eliminated in the face of potential bail-outs. Institutions expecting to 
receive public support hold significantly smaller amounts of tangible common 
equity to total assets (Nier and Baumann 2006). 
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proceedings for sovereign nations creates problematic outcomes that 
may require reconciliation through a common framework. 
If one wants to implement an internationally recognized 
procedure for insolvency proceedings, it must be undertaken via an 
agreed upon and voluntarily entered set of rules. The International 
Monetary Fund has stepped in recently to provide such an agreement 
though it has, unfortunately, done so in such a way that promotes 
large-scale liquidity crises threatening the solvency of sovereigns, and 
ultimately, their central banks. 
Enter the IMF 
In response to a number of major global financial crises 
throughout the 1990s, the IMF increased its role as an intermediary in 
these international affairs.4 Increased calls for the IMF to function as 
an international lender of last resort to stave off these insolvency 
crises would allow for more orderly exits to normalcy (Gilpin 2000: 
335). With the existence of an overseeing agency, international capital 
markets could function with renewed confidence that a financial crisis 
(such as the liquidity crisis of late 2008) would not jeopardize debt 
repayments – especially crises in seemingly faraway places that would 
normally not be considered threats, except through contagion. 
One significant failing of this push for an international lender of 
last resort is that the more countries the IMF bails-out, the more 
exacerbated will be the moral hazard problem in other countries. The 
risks inherent in an international lender of last resort may be 
unnecessary in most instances. After all, sovereign nations have a 
built-in advantage that a central bank has the ability to inflate the 
money supply and retire debt obligations denominated in its own 
currency. This salient feature – a central bank acting as a lender of 
last resort – should eliminate the possibility that insolvency of the 
                                 
4 We may remind ourselves of the Mexican peso crisis, the Russian debt 
default crisis, the Asian crisis, the Brazilian crisis, and later the Argentine crisis, et 
al. A renewed focus on sovereign insolvency has resulted from the turmoil these 
episodes have caused, and the amplification of the troubles through traditional 
strategies to deal with debt crises (Bolton and Skeel 2004: 764). 
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banking system will occur.5  
One issue is that artificially induced stability in emerging 
countries due to the existing perception of international bailouts has 
provided investors the ability to diversify funding away from the 
emerging country’s domestic currency (which will still suffer from an 
embedded and elevated risk premium) and into more stable foreign 
currencies. The IMF has recently noted that exchange rate stability 
today, while vital for growth of developing economies, must be 
balanced against the future need for adjustment (IMF 2009: 45). 
These foreign funding sources allow for a lower risk premium and 
hence a decreased carrying cost of debt. The stable exchange rates 
induced by the IMF lead to an “underpricing” of risk in the form of 
decreased foreign exchange rate volatility. As a result, there are 
strong forces enticing both governments and investors to take on 
foreign-denominated liabilities. 
Central banks operating in their function as lenders of last resort 
can function, however, only within certain limits. One salient and 
specific limitation is that a central bank has the ability to inflate the 
money supply only in its own domestic currency. If no currency 
mismatch occurs, no conflict arises between a central bank and its 
ability to function as a lender of last resort (Chang and Velasco 
2000a, b; Goodhart and Huang 2000). However, as we will see, the 
extent to which liabilities are foreign-denominated hinders the 
effectiveness of a central bank, and may render it impotent in the face 
of a liquidity crisis. 
Enter the National Central Bank 
Private businesses are disciplined to balance the denomination of 
their liabilities against those of their assets or income sources. 
Exchange rate fluctuations create uncertainty, and add a cost to 
taking on liabilities or diversifying revenue streams with diverse 
currencies. For example, a liability may be forced into redemption in 
                                 
5 This inflationary solution ensures the solvency of the banking system 
through a wealth transfer from savers, and involves the use of inflation as a tax 
(Bagus et al. 2011).  
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a foreign currency and depending on the exchange rate prevailing at 
the time it could prove exceedingly costly for a firm to cover this 
expense. The central bank of a country is under no such constraint. 
Fiat money gives the central monetary authority the advantage 
that its own liabilities – primarily the monetary base – will never be 
forced into redemption for anything other than the same nominal 
units they are denominated in.6 
However, the central bank has a raison d'être different from other 
institutions. While banks typically serve the dual role of 
intermediating depositors and borrowers of different time horizons as 
well as safekeeping deposits for customers until they are requested, a 
central bank serves a much broader function. The task of “economic” 
or “price” stability is lofted onto its shoulders. 
Central banks functioning as market makers rely on having assets 
of sufficient quality and quantity to swap with banking system 
counterparties to maintain the illusion of liquidity in an otherwise 
illiquid environment. An insolvent central bank would have the 
characteristic of lacking this market-making ability.  
Typically, we view insolvency in one of two ways. First, cash flow 
insolvency implies an inability to pay obligations as they fall due (i.e., 
illiquidity). Balance sheet insolvency, on the other hand, is that 
condition where liabilities exceed assets. Of these two, cash flow 
insolvency is the more pressing concern for the banking system. The 
mismatch in maturities between bank liabilities (mostly deposits, and 
redeemable on demand) and assets (mostly loans) exposes each bank 
to cash flow insolvency if its assets lose sufficient value or if its 
liabilities are redeemed en masse. If liquidity cannot be maintained 
when cash flow insolvency looms large – such as when deposit 
insurance is unavailable or when lending markets freeze so that short-
term funding is not available – balance sheet insolvency will set in; 
illiquidity of the banking system breeds insolvency if allowed to 
                                 
6 Buiter (2008: 2) and Hülsmann (2008: 162) discuss the peculiarity of central 
banks being forced to redeem their liabilities with increasing amounts of liabilities; 
i.e., funding redeemed notes through increasing amounts of note issuance. 
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continue.7  
A central bank suffering from balance sheet insolvency can still 
service its liabilities if they are denominated in domestic currency by 
increasing the money supply. In principle, such a central bank could 
still support its banking system via liquidity injections. While this 
conclusion holds for cases where liabilities are denominated in 
domestic currency, a central bank that wants to bail out an economy 
indebted in foreign-denominated debt will be constrained by its 
foreign-exchange reserves or the ability of the central bank to sell its 
currency to purchase foreign currency on the open market. Hence, 
only in those instances where the newly created money (plus the 
amount of existing assets) exchanged for foreign currency is higher 
than the existing foreign debts of the banking system will these 
foreign-denominated liabilities be able to be bailed out by the central 
bank. That is to say, if the real value of the newly inflated money 
supply can stay ahead of the purchasing power losses of the existing 
money stock (via the declining foreign exchange rate), then a central 
bank will have no significant difficulty inflating its way out of an 
insolvency-induced predicament. 
What are the remedies in the case when a central bank has 
insufficient foreign-exchange reserves to support the banking 
system´s debts, and also cannot raise foreign currency on the open 
market? In those cases the central bank must choose between 
attempting to save the banking system and preserving its own 
solvency. Insolvency becomes a problem for the central bank because 
in the process of extending liquidity to the banking sector, it must 
purchase the assets that originally created the liquidity troubles. As 
the central bank increases its holdings of illiquid assets it increases the 
probability of insolvency through losses on its low-quality assets. It 
should be pointed out that even major central banks, such as the Fed 
or the ECB, face at least the possibility of balance sheet insolvency 
(Bagus and Schiml 2009; Bagus and Howden 2009a, b). This may arise 
                                 
7 Buiter (2008: 5) and Lastra (2007) provide overviews of the conceptual 
differences between these two insolvency types, with the repercussions of cash 
flow insolvency to banking institutions. 
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due to losses suffered on both central banks´ low quality asset 
purchases throughout the crisis. A recapitalization in the case of the 
Fed would be straightforward, though, as the U.S. Treasury could 
transfer government bonds to the Fed. The Fed also faces pseudo-
insolvency or inability to rescue the banking system if it tries to buy 
the domestic assets of the banking industry by swapping them for the 
higher quality assets on its own balance sheet (Bagus and Howden 
2009a, b). While under this scenario the central bank has its swap 
operations limited by the amount and quality of its available assets, a 
simple solution to this eventual problem is a bailout of the central 
bank by the government and an ensuing monetization of the newly 
issued debt. In this scenario, assets that the central bank wishes to 
purchase that are denominated in the domestic currency (e.g., U.S. 
dollars) can be printed with no significant difficulty. This role is one 
defining characteristic of the modern central bank – namely, that it 
acts as a lender of last resort when the banking sector finds itself in 
solvency troubles. 
However, what if a banking system is not saddled with debt 
denominated in domestic currency, but is instead primarily foreign 
denominated? In this case, the central monetary authority is limited 
in its role as a lender of last resort, as its monetary policies are limited 
to regulatory changes of the banking sector (i.e., reserve 
requirements, capital adequacy ratios, etc.), open market operations 
using its balance sheet assets to offset transactions, or inflating the 
(domestic) money supply. In this situation, foreign reserves become 
the linchpin to maintaining the solvency of a banking system heavily 
indebted in foreign currencies. 
The recent crisis has illustrated how economies heavily indebted 
in foreign currencies were strained as global liquidity dried up. Buiter 
and Sibert (2008), Bagus and Howden (2011) and Howden (2013a, b) 
explain that the Icelandic banking system has been the most evident 
case of this problem. As the Central Bank of Iceland lacked the ability 
to inflate any currency other than the domestic króna, its banking 
system heavily indebted in foreign liabilities (primarily Japanese Yen 
and Swiss Francs) quickly succumbed to insolvency. As the central 
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bank moved in to perform its stated role as lender of last resort, it too 
was left with few policy options because it lacked foreign-
denominated assets to fund the struggling financial sector.8 In the 
end, currency swaps and lines of credit by friendly nations were 
required to mitigate its financial collapse. Currency swaps for less 
demanded currencies (like the Icelandic króna) become problematic 
as there is little demand for a central bank to hold a long-term 
position in an unimportant currency.  
One countervailing force to this unfortunate fact is that a small 
country may have embedded itself so thoroughly in the global 
financial system that insolvency could spark a contagion. In this case, 
central banks may find it in their best interests to commit swap 
agreements against a minimally demanded currency, provided that 
the risk of a systematic collapse of the global system could be 
mitigated as a result. 
One complicating factor arises when a central bank’s return on its 
interest-bearing assets declines relative to the charges paid on its 
interest-bearing liabilities. Typically, central bank liabilities exist 
solely in one of two forms: currency and bank reserves, which 
together form the monetary base. While currency is not interest 
bearing, reserves may be remunerated as per the central bank’s 
regulations. Assets are comprised of government debts and loans to 
the banking system. Depending on the maturity of the debt held as 
assets, a jump in interest rates could leave the central bank in the 
detrimental position of having to pay more interest on its liabilities 
than it earns on its assets. This particular case occurred in Argentina 
dramatically after 1987, and led the central bank to cover the 
difference through seigniorage via an inflated money supply (World 
Bank 1993: 180). The end result was the sharp depreciation of the 
                                 
8 Iceland provided a curious case of an explicitly stated lender of last resort 
function embedded in the central bank's functions (Central Bank of Iceland 2001). 
While this is normally only implicitly acknowledged in other central banks, the 
effects that this exerted on the moral hazard among the Icelandic banking industry 
must have been increased compared to other countries, partly explaining the 
excess of its boom (Howden 2013b). 
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currency, and eventually, the Argentine economy. Nor does this 
possibility exist only in developing countries, or those with in a 
currency crisis. By committing to pay interest on reserve balances 
while purchasing Treasury bills at record low interest rates, the Fed 
has opened itself to potential losses on its balance sheet (Rudebusch 
2011). 
Another complicating factor arises when a negative currency 
mismatch coexists with a trade deficit. Not only will a currency 
mismatch prove to be an urgent problem requiring a source of foreign 
currency to offset, but it will likely be an ongoing problem in light of a 
sustained trade deficit. Under a flexible exchange rate regime the 
currency will depreciate to compensate for the sustained deficit. In 
contrast, under a fixed exchange rate regime, lacking an inflow of 
foreign currency in excess of the outflow, a central bank will be faced 
with a dwindling supply of currency reserves. In times of highly liquid 
debt markets, this is not necessarily problematic for trustworthy 
borrowers (as, e.g., Iceland had been) because regardless of 
denomination, the existing debt can be easily rolled over. When credit 
conditions contract, as occurred globally in late 2008, this rollover 
becomes ever more difficult as lenders are reluctant to extend 
liquidity further.9 As a result, many entrepreneurs as well as 
governments may face a liquidity crunch that can only be mitigated 
through the supply of foreign currency or high quality assets easily 
convertible to foreign currency. To the extent that a prolonged trade 
deficit persists, a central bank’s foreign reserves may be depleted to 
the point where there is an inadequate supply available to mitigate a 
crisis, and external help must be sought. 
IMF drawing rights and currency swaps can be used in these 
instances to provide foreign liquidity to a domestic banking system. 
However, in light of a global crisis freezing the credit markets, one 
significant issue that arises is the scarcity of credit. In particular, the 
                                 
9 McGuire and von Peter (2009: 58) assess the failure of European banks’ 
abilities to continually roll over U.S. dollar investments during the recent crisis, 
thus resulting in longer-term maturity holdings in compensation. This, in turn, 
exacerbated the maturity mismatch, generating a U.S. dollar shortage. 
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IMF’s drawing rights are limited, and unable to be quickly 
expanded.10 Drawing rights represent a pre-paid fund that lacks the 
ability to replenish itself without external assistance. Swap agreements 
are a more scalable method to establish lines of credit in the 
necessary denomination. However, there are two significant 
drawbacks in using this option. The first is the time component 
necessary to arrange a politically acceptable swap. Unless there is an 
active pre-negotiated arrangement, requests for funding may require 
lengthy debate on the swap terms (i.e., the repayment agreement, the 
extent of the swap, currencies involved, contingencies, etc). A more 
salient, if latent, point is that times of global crisis place limitations on 
the “friendliness” of many central banks. Arranging swap agreements 
under the increasingly stressed conditions of a liquidity crisis becomes 
more questionable than during more normal times.11  
Losses may result due to exchange rate fluctuations and the real 
appreciation of the swaps. Moreover, these swaps may entail interest 
payments denominated in foreign currency. The possibility of cash 
flow insolvency for the banking system looms large, primarily due to 
foreign-denominated liabilities, and represents a commitment too 
large for a recapitalization by the government to be feasible.  
Recapitalization of Insolvent Central Banks 
Having seen that it is possible in special circumstances for central 
banks to become insolvent, we may ask the secondary question of 
what to do about it. Central banks are viewed, in many developed 
countries, as de jure independent of the states they function within. In 
the American case of the Fed, this independence can be seen as 
tenuous. The Fed holds on its balance sheet government debt issued 
through the Treasury. This interest-bearing asset provides the central 
bank with the financing required for day-to-day operations. At year-
                                 
10 Lipton (2000) suggests that pooling IMF special drawing rights into a 
“crisis fund”, to be used when combating systemic threats, would increase the 
efficiency of their implementation, and hence, allow for quicker interventions. 
11 Indeed, Jónsson (2009: 138) discusses Iceland’s lack of aid from its former 
“friends” during its recent crisis in the form of required foreign liquidity, which 
was not forthcoming.  
 Philipp Bagus and David Howden 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 
16 
end, the Fed remits to the Treasury its net-operating profit which 
amounts to the interest income earned on this Treasury debt less its 
operating expenses. This amounts to a tax on the central bank, as the 
amount of this payment is determined (and enforced) through the 
Treasury (Buiter 2008: 6). 
However, we may note that this transfer payment need not always 
be positive. As a central bank nears insolvency, this payment can be 
made negative. The result is that a mechanism is introduced whereby 
the central bank can be recapitalized with no structural changes to its 
operating procedure, nor significant legislative changes to its scope of 
operations. Notably, this need not be only a one-time occurrence. 
Because economic turbulence may introduce a strain on the central 
bank’s liquidity and solvency, a recurring transfer payment back to the 
Treasury may be halted (or reduced) with the result that the central 
bank’s budget constraint is considerably slackened.12 This method 
amounts to a bailout by the Treasury.13 
As the central bank’s liabilities are generally (though not always) 
non-interest bearing and non-redeemable, it may be able to prolong 
its own solvency. Reducing its operating expenses is the typical way 
that any other firm would promote solvency. The central bank has the 
structural advantage that it may inflate its money issuance, and earn a 
                                 
12 Buiter (2004; 2005; 2007; 2008), Ize (2005) and Sims (2004; 2005) provided 
detailed analyses of this mechanism to recapitalize the central bank by shifting its 
intertemporal budget constraint. As Buiter (2008) details, this makes it possible 
for a central bank’s present net worth to be negative, while maintaining solvency 
provided the present value of future seigniorage is greater than the sum of the 
future transfer payments to the Treasury and operating expenses. With the 
possibility of a negative transfer payment to the Treasury, a central bank’s net 
worth will allow for continued operations. 
13 While a Treasury- induced bail-out is a fairly straight forward objective 
within the Federal Reserve System, the Eurosystem entails a much more daunting 
task. The lender of last resort function in the EMU is assumed by each national 
central bank. Hence, complications arise when the centralized ECB requires 
recapitalization (Lastra 2000). Buiter (2008: 9-10) and Bagus and Howden (2009a) 
explore the difficulties in recapitalizing the European Central Bank that come 
from these national sharing arrangements. To head off this eventuality, the ECB 
has taken strides to increase its capital in the wake of losses in December 2010. 
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positive seigniorage income in doing so. Hence, the present value of 
the future seigniorage stream allows for maintained solvency, 
provided debts are domestically denominated and not inflation 
indexed. A central bank may bail itself out, then, in cases of certain 
insolvencies. However, two limitations hinder this process. 
The first is the existence of index-linked (i.e., inflation adjusted) 
liabilities. Inflating the money supply in an attempt to generate 
seigniorage revenue may entail increased price inflation. If a central 
bank’s mandate includes an element of price stability, this may be a 
political limitation on this policy’s pursuit. More critically, even if this 
path of action were politically feasible, it relies on the inflation 
premium on debt to increase at a slower rate than the increase in the 
money supply. Central bank transparency and its effects on investor 
expectations become crucial as they will determine to what degree 
inflationary expectations will counter the monetary expansion the 
central bank uses to bail itself out. 
The second limitation is the degree of foreign-denominated debt 
on the central bank’s balance sheet. Inflating base money to retire 
foreign-denominated liabilities will function only so long as the 
exchange rate is not affected adversely. As investors price this 
inflation into the exchange rate, the real value of these liabilities will 
increase. To the extent that investors price in the inflationary bailout 
premium faster than the nominal increase in the money supply, this 
form of bailout will prove to be sterile in retiring foreign-
denominated debts. Lacking an external lender to provide a line of 
credit or swap arrangement, a central bank will not be able to meet its 
own funding needs from its resources. The result would entail either a 
failed hyper-inflationary policy, and/or central bank insolvency 
(Buiter 2008: 8).14 
Analyzing the implications between the two options for an 
international lender of last resort to recapitalize insolvent banks, 
Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003) discover two irreconcilable difficulties. 
                                 
14 Buiter and Sibert (2008: appendix 1) derive a simple model demonstrating 
the upper-limit on foreign-currency seigniorage that may be produced by inflating 
the domestic money supply to exchange for foreign currency.  
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The first is that as the resources of an international lender of last 
resort must be carried out by the issuer of the necessary currency, the 
possibility for a crisis-inducing panic cannot be removed completely. 
In fact, a dependence on one lender of last resort will always involve 
an uncertain element as to whether the adequate bailout will be 
forthcoming.  
Consequently, reliance on a single producer of currency will leave 
uncertainty concerning the expectation that a bailout will obtain. 
Alternatively, if the lender of last resort function is carried out by a 
limited fund’s backing the domestic banking sector’s safety nets, then 
the resources need not be larger than the liquidity gap of the domestic 
banking sector (the difference between the short-term foreign-
denominated liabilities and the foreign-denominated liquid assets). 
While this second approach is more practical than the first, the 
aforementioned moral hazard and agency problems arise because of 
the need for an “international banking fund” to provide such services. 
Eichengreen (1999) and Rogoff (1999) argue that this particular 
lender of last resort would require an amount of hard currency that, 
although finite, is unrealistically large. As a consequence of this lack 
of an international lender of last resort, banking systems heavily 
indebted in foreign-denominated or inflation-indexed debt expose 
their own central banks to insolvency. 
Conclusion 
Recently, the European debt crisis has brought into focus the 
question of how best to deal with banking and sovereign debt crises. 
In this article we provide the link between sovereign insolvency, its 
prescribed medicine (international bail-outs) and the potentiality of 
central bank insolvencies and collapses of banking systems. Sovereign 
insolvency has led to more engagement and help via the IMF. This 
implicit bailout guarantee on the part of the IMF has provided 
increased exchange rate stability. This increased stability entices 
investors to take on more foreign-denominated debt ex ante, 
necessitating IMF aid ex post to align market conditions with their 
former expectations.  
Normally market conditions provide a disincentive to investors 
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and governments to take on excessive amounts of foreign-
denominated debts via the risk premium of exchange rate volatility. 
This premium can be reduced through actions affecting the default 
options in cases of sovereign default. For example, the IMF’s recent 
role as a lender of last resort has given otherwise turbulent economies 
an exogenous source of stability. One benefit to this action has been 
the promotion and prolonging of economic growth. However, there 
are hidden costs involved which are only now becoming apparent. 
This period of increased stability not only reduces the risk 
premium on the debt from these affected countries. It has also been 
manifested as increased stability in the respective exchange rates. As a 
direct result, investors and governments are inclined to take 
advantage of these stable exchange rates by financing debt in foreign 
currencies. Benefits are received through reduced debt payments via 
lower interest charges (themselves reflecting lower risk premia). 
While this process works well while global money markets remain 
liquid, in the midst of a crisis this liquidity can be removed. 
As the banking system accumulates foreign-denominated 
liabilities, the central bank potentially finds itself in a difficult position 
as a lender of last resort. In fact, to fulfill this role the central bank 
must indebt itself in foreign currency. This, in turn, opens the 
possibility for its own insolvency as it obtains debt denominated in a 
currency it cannot produce. Thus, we see the importance of the 
quality of the assets of a central bank in relation to its liabilities, the 
potential needs of the financial system it supports, and ultimately its 
currency. 
Only endowed with the ability to inflate in the domestic currency, 
a central bank must rely on its foreign exchange reserves to retire 
foreign-denominated liabilities. As previous prolonged trade deficits 
may have reduced these reserves, central banks may find themselves 
especially impotent in the face of liquidity crises. As foreign-
denominated liabilities overwhelm a central bank’s reserves, it is left 
with no options with which to ensure liquidity in the system – it is 
rendered impotent and may even face insolvency. 
Focus on insolvency procedures concerning insolvent sovereign 
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states has overlooked the salient point of why this insolvency occurs in 
the first place. To the extent that liabilities are foreign-denominated 
and a central bank lacks the foreign exchange reserves to retire these 
liabilities, the state and the central bank run the risk of insolvency. 
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